Abuja Deadline: Who's pushing for it, why, and what the consequences will be

Today, 30 April 2006, marks the African Union's self-imposed deadline to "wrap up" this round (the 7th) of Darfur peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. While a true peace settlement - one that both quells the genocidal killings and assures the Darfur region a viable future in the political, economic, and social structure of the Sudanese state - would be welcomed, the pending conclusion to these talks will not leave us with a true settlement, nor is their hasty and pressured culmination anything to be welcomed. Herein lies the crux of the problem facing Darfur, and the world at large, in achieving a secure and stable Darfur; a peace agreement is necessary for any long-term solution to what essentially began as a political conflict (between two rebel groups complaining of neglect and marginalization by the self-styled "Arab" riverain Khartoum ruling elite), but in its slow progress, this very search for peace - almost by definition laborious and complicated, but also impeded by the antagonistic and uncompromising will of Khartoum - undermines any ability to effectively protect the civilians suffering from the violence. This frustrating and seemingly contradictory dynamic has emerged as a result of two factors: first, the UN is constrained, as per the Brahimi Report, to only send a peacekeeping force to areas where a peace agreement has been achieved (see Dr. Wafula Okumu, "The African Union Peace and Security Architecture"); and second, the Khartoum government is opportunistically exploiting this international reluctance by wielding the illusory promise of peace as a dilatory obstruction of any meaningful humanitarian intervention. The Khartoum genocidaires have eagerly pushed for the conclusion of the Abuja talks with exactly this in mind; unfortunately they have been joined here by the unwitting accomplices of the AU, other African nations, particularly Nigeria (the host of the talks), the UN, and the United States.
At 10:46 am Eastern Standard Time this morning, Reuters reported that the Sudanese Government had agreed to the terms of the 85-page peace proposal put on the table by the African Union on April 25 (see "Sudanese Government Accepts Darfur Peace Deal," Reuters, 30 April 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-sudan-darfur.html?hp&ex=1146456000&en=aa1c33c4fd03e6b0&ei=5094&partner=homepage). This should come as no surprise, given the widespread evidence that the document is effectively a pax romana imposed on the rebels and designed both to ensure their continued subjugation and, more significantly for the immediate term, to satisfy the international community and allow the Sudanese government to continue to underhandedly pursue its genocidal aims under a cloak of peace. The document represents no significant departure from the the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement signed over two years ago, in April 2004, the Abuja Protocols of November 2004, or the series of seven UN Security Council Resolutions issued between July 2004 and May 2005; rather, it essentially maintains the status quo. While this proposal, deceptively called the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), requires the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed militias serving as their genocidal cavalry, this is the same hollow "demand" of UN SC Resolution 1556 almost two years ago, and reiterated at length since. No one disagrees that the "ceasefire" stipulated by N'djamena is entirely meaningless in practice; the shocking realization is that for two years, the African Union, supported by the international community, has actively limited its enforcement presence to monitoring (the lack of) compliance with a meaningless, nonexistent illusion. This is exactly the status quo that the GoS (Government of Sudan) is fervently hoping to maintain, and it has (accurately) calculated that the best means to do so is to hastily concoct a nominal peace agreement that will allow onlookers to wash their hands of responsibility and at the same time accord the GoS a measure of breathing room for its malicious policies.
Two other factors likely motivate the GoS's frantic push to conclude the Abuja talks. The first is to ensure that the rebel groups do not achieve any actual concessions, and the second is a purely pragmatic incentive; Khartoum is looking for an expedient way to rid itself of the Darfur "problem," and a one-sided agreement would very likely codify its political dominance and sweep away the legitimate aspirations of the Darfur rebels. This latter is not meant to detract from GoS's interest in achieving a legal guise for its long-term genocidal ambitions, as explained above, for I believe this is its primary impetus in signing a DPA that will avert the eyes of the world and provide the Sudanese military and its Janjaweed proxies with ample room to "ethnically cleanse" this "troublesome" region by murdering, raping, mutilating, and forcibly displacing Darfurian civilians. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the persistence of the Darfur issue is grating to the Khartoum elites. We must remembere here that the entire genocide began in the summer of 2003 as a strategical GoS decision to engage in what Alex De Waal termed "counter-insurgency on the cheap" (see Alex De Waal, "Counter-insurgency on the cheap, The London Review of Books, vol. 26, no. 15, 5 August 2004), whereby the government could spare its time, money, and forces (many of which were Darfurian and refused to massacre their brethren) by recruiting Janjaweed militias, a tactic that also allowed it to deflect international pressure by denying (transparently) its involvement in the genocide and using the (relatively effective, given its appalling use by the State Department's Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick as late as November 2005; see Zoellick's 9 November 2005 University of Khartoum speech, available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0511/S00255.htm) label of "tribal warfare" to downplay the atrocities in Darfur that it was and is in fact directing and managing. It is in Khartoum's interests to achieve the codified victory that signing this peace agreement would grant them: the continued political and economic dominance of the riverain elites would be assured, no more resources would need to be expended in the pursuit of genocide, and the pesky complaints and reservations issued by the international community, particularly the United States, could be (more effectively) brushed aside. This latter concern is, I believe, along with the violent pursuit of self-preservation, foremost in the desires of Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his ruling elites; their survivalist mentality has led them to eagerly voice their "cooperation" with the American-led "war on terror," with the aspirations of ending the sanctions that the US imposed on Sudan in 1999 for harboring Osama bin Laden for five years, removing the label of "state sponsor of terrorism" they are still (and correctly, though probably not for the reasons the US sees) officially branded with, and opening up and increasing American investment in their vast oil reserves (which China has been enjoying since their exploitation). In short, if this began as a "counter-insurgency on the cheap," what GoS is seeking in Abuja is a "peace treaty on the cheap."
All indications point to the conclusion that, if the fragmented SLM/A and JEM do manage to come together, (unfortunately and forebodingly) swallow their well-founded reservations to the treaty proposal, and sign the DPA in the next few hours, Khartoum will have achieved its desired "cheap" peace. By every account, the AU proposal is overwhelmingly unsatisfactory to the rebel groups. SLM/A spokesman Mahjoub Hussein has repeatedly voiced his objections that "[t]he peace plan is much closer to the government’s plans as opposed to being balanced" (see “Sudan under pressure as Darfur peace deadline nears,” Sudan Tribune 28 April 2006). Hussein rejects "the shadow of the governmental intransigence and inflexibility” under which, as he acknowledges, the peace talks are being conducted. This perceived opposition of one entire side of the talks to their terms should serve as enough to prove their unviability, but an objective look at certain components of the proposal cements that conclusion. The AU-brokered DPA would create a "Transitional Regional Darfur Authority" to ensure the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); this sounds admirable on its face, but the realization that IDPs are years away from being able to return to their homes, namely because they themselves do not yet feel safe to do so (the UN Assessment Mission of 10-22 March 2005 recognized this, and Eric Reeves, in "Proposed Increases in African Union Monitoring Presence in Darfur," 7 May 2005, put forth the statistic that 98% of households surveyed did not yet feel safe to return) renders this provision at best laughable and at worst, and more likely, downright dangerous, given GoS's demonstrated proclivity to forcibly return villagers to their homes (see Human Rights Watch, “‘If We Return, We Will Be Killed’: Consolidation of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur, Sudan,” 15 November 2004), a practice explicitly forbidden by Security Council resolutions. In this light, the creation of this organization appears to be an attempt to bypass the necessary assurances of civilian security by pretending civilians can return to their homes as soon as they wish, which would likely generate a chaos that GoS would be only too happy to exploit.
The two major issues inciting negative reactions among the rebel negotiating side are those of wealth-sharing, power distribution, and security arrangements. As to the first, it is simply hugely unlikely that Khartoum will follow up on any promises to distribute a proportional share of its wealth (namely oil revenues) to a region populated by, in their eyes, rebels and racial inferiors, whom they have historically excluded from reaping any financial benefits and who will likely continue to be excluded. A central demand of the rebel groups was also the creation of a Vice-Presidential post reserved for a Darfurian, similar to the Naivasha Accords' stipulation for a Southerner to hold the First Vice Presidency (while National Islamic Front genocidal architect Ali Osman Taha of course still retained the Second Vice Presidency). The "compromise" hashed out at Abuja was the allocation of a "Senior Assistant to the President," fourth in the executive chain of command, to a Darfurian. The prospects of this are not appealing to the rebel negotiators, nor would they likely result in a crack in real NIF dominance in Khartoum even if implemented assiduously. Finally, and of most concern to the rebels, is the AU proposal's requirement that SLA and JEM fighters be reincorporated into the Sudanese Army. This proposition is as scary as it is unfeasible and vehemently rejected; one of the strongest complaints of Darfurians before the genocide was their historically disproportionate numbers in the Sudanese armed forces, where they were forced to kill non-Arabs in the South for years before refusing to fight their own kinsmen in Darfur. The Sudanese government's expectation to diffuse the rebel threat by bringing them back into the fold of the Popular Defence Forces (the Sudanese army) attests at once to their disingenousness in seeking peace and their true malevolent desires to subdue any Darfurian claims for representation and any pretense of security protecting the civilian population. Mahjoub Hussein acknowledged the importance in resisting this outlandish requirement, calling this a "red line" and declaring that "approaching this line means that the government’s delegation would have to pack its luggage (in Abuja) and go back to Khartoum with no-one regretting its departure" (see “Darfur rebel SLM rejects integration of its forces in the army,” Sudan Tribune, 30 April, 2006). The extent to which GoS is able to cross this line in whatever emerges out of Abuja - which will undoubtedly be hailed by the international community as a breakthrough - will prove how much the world has truly abandoned the Darfurian people.
A couple of final thoughts about the inadequacy of the substantive (as much as that can be seen as anything but a misnomer) aspects of the Abuja talks. I find the pretense of legitimacy granted the negotiation process utterly ridiculous; as one striking example, the text of the proposal in Arabic was only presented to the parties on Saturday (29 April), leaving the 70% of the JEM delegation who do not speak English to be simply "carr[ied]...along" (see “AU, UN put pressure on Darfur parties to come to an agreement,” Sudan Tribune, 30 April 2006). This merely accentuates another problem with the composition of the talks - the fractured nature of the rebel delegations. The split between Abdel Wahed Mohammed el-Nur and Minni Arcua Minnawi of the SLM/A is well-documented (see especially International Crisis Group, "Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace," Africa Briefing No. 32, Nairobi/Brussels, 6 October 2005), and the united face they agreed to put on for the Abuja delegations does little to resolve the actual conflict between them. Furthermore, the recent exit of a necessarily major player in the entire affair, the government of Chad, stripped the peace process of any credibility it might have conveyed. The Déby government, who stormed out of Abuja in protest to alleged (and accurate) accusations of Sudanese support for anti-Déby Chadian rebel groups, only did itself a disservice by turning its back on a process that necessarily implicates them. As Sudanese government-back Janjaweed increasingly raid Chadian villages and participate in efforts to oust the Déby regime, the fluidity of the Chad-Darfur border becomes clear. This cannot be stressed enough; neither the Janjaweed, nor the Chadian rebels, nor the Sudanese government, nor probably anyone else (Libyan Colonel Muammar al-Ghaddafi's 1980's occupation of Darfur comes to mind, as does Déby's use of the province as a jumping-off point for his 1990 coup; Gérard Prunier gives a good account of both in Le Darfour: Un génocide ambigu (Paris: La Table Ronde, October 2005) respects the "border" separating Chad and Sudan, and as long as this genocide continues, Déby will not be able to pass it off as an internal Sudanese problem.
Even if we can brush the specific provisions of the proposed DPA aside as the unjust imposition of terms, which we fortunately now can do with some assurance, as I notice that, as of 4:11 pm Eastern Time today, the Darfur rebels have officially rejected the proposal on the table (see "Rebels Reject Darfur Peace Deal," The Associated Press, 30 April 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Nigeria-Darfur-Talks.html), the problems behind it still remain. My primary concern has to do with the all-your-eggs-in-one-basket (and a hastily constructed and inherently flawed basket at that) mentality that seems to motivate GoS, obviously, but also the talks' host country, Nigeria, and the most powerful world player, the United States. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo had made it clear that his country might not be willing to host yet another round of peace talks, casting the pall of a "last chance" mindset on the entire proceedings. To convince himself of the legitimacy of this expulsion, Obasanjo naïvely opined that the peace accords will produce “no winner, no vanquished. Everybody will feel satisfied" (see “AU, UN put pressure on Darfur parties to come to an agreement,” Sudan Tribune, 30 April 2006). Obasanjo's self-deception is eclipsed only by that of the US, whose significance rings perhaps even louder, given the weight of American influence, which can apparently be tamed by the most mild and superficial alleviations of conscience. Robert Zoellick, whom the Bush administration has "put in charge" ("relegated" seems a more appopriate term given American lack of engagement on the issue) of Darfur policy, recently displayed his ignorance and capacity for self-delusion, professing his confidence in the Abuja talks; "I believe we can get this done," he disingenously asserted, making the uncredible claim that “conditions [were] ripe for a breakthrough” (Sudan Tribune, “Darfur Breakthrough Possible in Abuja Talks – US,” 13 April 2006). Zoellick's characterization of any action without a peace accord as a "band-aid" (Ibid.), while perhaps recognizing the importance of achieving an agreement for long-term stability, manifestly exhibits the same sort of diversionary tactics exuded by US and UN leaders. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's statement this week, buoyed by false confidence in the Abuja process, that ''[o]bviously a peace agreement would be a very important step forward in getting this done,'' conceals the US's Brahimi-like requirement binding itself to, and serving as an excuse for, inaction. Despite the codified crisis avoided today by the rebels' rejection of GoS's peace terms, Darfur is of course still in a wretched state of crisis, one perhaps exacerbated by the international abandonment that will likely occur as a result of the frustration of the international community's hope that April 30 would provide them with an easy cop-out for inaction. Similarly, Darfurians will likely face reprisals from an equally frustrated GoS. The words of one anonymous AU mediator at Abuja, voiced ostensibly in support of the peace talks but coming off sounding much more like an ominous foreboding, keep ringing in my head: "Failure in Abuja [will] only intensify the suffering of the Darfur people" (quoted in “AU, UN put pressure on Darfur parties to come to an agreement,” Sudan Tribune, 30 April 2006).

Introduction

This blog is intended to provide a perspective - mine at least, hopefully relatively sane and lucid - on recent news and events in Darfur, Sudan. While I admit to being an amateur (for real expert analysis, please check out www.sudanreeves.org) and that this is largely an experiment for myself, I hope it provides at least some insight in looking at the political and historical realities underlying the tragedy currently unfolding in Darfur. I intend to skip perfunctory introduction and dive right into the intricacies, but hopefully this will nonetheless be helpful to those along the entire spectrum of familiarity with Darfur. I cannot stress enough my support for the Genocide Intervention Network (www.genocideintervention.net), a crucial starting point (along with www.savedarfur.org) for finding out what you can do to help end this genocide, the first of the 21st century.