US Envoy Andrew Natsios, in his recent "very successful" five day trip to China, supposedly procured enough assurances from Beijing to up the ante of its pressure on Sudan that he felt comfortable asserting that "Our policy and the Chinese policy are closer than I realized they were, and I think the Chinese are going to play an increasingly important role in helping us to resolve this" (Reuters, "US asks China to exert pressure on Sudan," 12 January 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19717). Natsios' "requests" to China, his bloated confidence, and the subsequent (and predictable) reactions to his statements by both Chinese and Sudanese government spokesmen, combine to reveal much about this political triangle.
A befuddled Zhai Jun, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister for Africa, immediately repudiated, Natsios' comments, reassuring his Sudanese allies that under no circumstances would his country exert any pressure whatsoever on Sudan (Sudan Tribune, "China says no pressure on Sudan following US envoy visit," 16 January, 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19767). Zhai's unequivocal rejection of Natsios' optimism both unmasks the US Envoy's naïveté and blatantly exposes the stark reality of the mutually beneficial devil's compact between China and Sudan. China has exhibited no intention or desire to sway from their traditional stance of indifference toward human rights abuses committed by their business partners, and their tidy arrangement with Sudan nets them both a huge supply of their oil and another ally in the struggle to preserve sovereignty as a blanket obscuring and excusing actions within one's own territory (to the detriment of Tibetans and other oppressed Chinese). Sudan, of course, receives much needed political support, to the tune of a UN Security Council veto, which, despite reports that China has never in fact used this veto in Darfur resolutions, nonetheless acts as a powerful deterrent (likely too powerful in fact, frightening other countries and leading them to water down proposals perhaps excessively).
The reaction from Khartoum, one of expressed "astonishment" at the gall of the US official, illuminates the extent to which Sudan relies on China as a protector. By feigning shock at what it depicts as a diplomatic gaffe, Sudan is clearly utilizing a tactic tailored to elicit consternation at Natsios' faux pas; their immediate employment of such a strategy in turn reveals how deeply the genocide they conduct in Darfur relies on Chinese complicity. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ali al-Sadiq paints his country as simply observing diplomatic norms, adopting a cooperative tone toward Natsios, yet, by chastising his efforts with China, simultaneously implicitly threatening his presence as contingent upon the goodwill of his hosts: "Sudan’s door is open to Natsios, who has already visited the country twice, and he has an opportunity to develop ideas and cooperate with the Sudanese government with regards to the Darfur problem" (Agence France Presse, "Sudan 'astonished' by US prodding China over Darfur," 13 January 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19733). Khartoum has intentionally attempted to display itself to the world as willing to operate within set guidelines - limited to the status quo of working (inefficiently) through the UN and AU - for making peace in Darfur and thus justify its demonization of Natsios' "efforts outside this framework...[as] pointless." Sudan's reaction belies the desperation with which Khartoum relies on what Sadiq calls "Sudan’s trade and economic partner[] and friend[]...[and] a main partner and strategic ally" for protection. Sadiq affirmed that "[w]e are confident that China will deal with us through the diplomatic dialogue existing between the two countries," which of course is transparent code for a policy of nonengagement, of letting the blood flow as long and as deeply as the oil does.
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