Abuja Extended: Brokered Peace or Khartoum's Genocidal Tool?

Perhaps some breathed a sigh of relief at the 48 hour extension granted to the parties in Abuja, Nigeria after the the failure to hash out a peace agreement to "end" the "conflict" in Darfur. Not only is such relief unwarranted and unfounded, it is not shared by the parties at the talks. The JEM and SLM/A representatives are likely only sighing with exasperation at Khartoum's continued intransigence and stubborn refusal to negotiate a veritable and equitable accord, while the GoS's only sigh is one of exasperation and fury that their heavy-handed imposition of "peace" - translation: the silencing of the pesky Darfur rebels and the return to the uneven status quo - has been thwarted. Joining the GoS in sighing with exasperation are the chief AU mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, who has repeatedly stressed how "frustrating" it has been to work with the Darfur rebels, as well as the African Union, United Nations, Arab League, European Union, and the United States, all of whom have made at least a token investment in success of the talks, if only to obviate them from more concentrated action.
The degree to which the proposal on the table at Abuja is a Khartoum-manufactured dictation of terms is indicated by the GoS's stubborn insistence to push forward and impose the provisions of the treaty despite the rebels' unwillingness to sign, according to statements made on Monday by the government's chief negotiator, Majzoub Khalifa (see "Sudan to move ahead on peace deal without rebel signatures," Sudan Tribune, 2 May 2006, at http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15406). This blatant disregard for the entire purpose and democratic process of the Abuja talks demonstrates that Khartoum's interest is not in obtaining a negotiated ceasefire and genuine peace agreement, but rather simply to advance its desires with the same callous indifference to the Darfurian people that it has demonstrated in its three year campaign of strategic and systematic slaughter. A further sign of the GoS's lack of intention to carry out any measure likely to realize an actual peace on the ground is its attempt to wiggle out of its obligation, according to the peace proposal that they stubbornly intend on one-sidedly implementing, to disarm the Janjaweed militias carrying out the brunt of its genocidal destruction. To do so, Khartoum is using a rhetorical technique that it has used throughout the genocide to obfuscate the role played by its murderous Janjaweed proxies - claiming that the Janjaweed are simply one of many "legitimate" "tribal militias" in the area (see "FACTBOX - Contentious issues in Darfur draft peace agreement, Reuters, 1 May 2006, at http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15387). This painfully transparent claim echoes the persistent dismissals of the Darfur genocide as a "tribal conflict," stretching to the ludicrous statement by the Khartoum Minister of Information that the Darfur rebel groups are the Janjaweed (see his incredible avowal that "[t]he rebels in Darfur have been a part and parcel of the Janjawid itself" in "SUDAN: Interview with Al Zhawi Ibrahim Malik, Information and Communications Minister," IRIN, 1 September 2004, at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=42972&SelectRegion=East_Africa). Whatever the tactic, Khartoum clearly had no intention of disarming the Janjaweed even with a peace agreement signed by both sides (why would they, as they have had plenty of opportunity to oblige by the N'djamena Ceasefire and Security Council Resolution 1556 in the past two years?); without an agreement, the Khartoum genocidaires may in fact be secretly reveling in the opportunity to react viciously against the Darfur rebels (and civilians), now seemingly holding the winning hand of being open to accomodation. The troubling statments of Mahjzoub Khalifa, the government representative, foreshadow an increase in brutal repression; he warned that "[a]nyone who obstructs peace efforts should be forced to bear responsibility" and that the rebels will be dealt with "seriously" for failing to uphold the role of willing victim at Abuja that Khartoum (and apparently, the world) expected it to (see "Sudan to move ahead...," supra).
As previously suggested, Khartoum's willingness to sign this agreement, coupled with the rebels' well-founded reluctance to do so, deceptively places the Sudanese government in the role of "good guy" with regard to public opinion. UN Special Envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk, completely duped (as usual) by Khartoum's disingenousness, lauded the government's preparation to sign the accord as an admirable "decision that they can sign the document though they said they did not like the document a hundred percent" (see "Darfur rebels reject peace deal, talks continue," Sudan Tribune, 30 April 2006, at http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15370). He cast the whole of the blame for the talks' failure to produce a signed document on the rebel negotiators, whom he insisted were "not worthy to be leaders" (Ibid.). Pronk even made the frightful statement that "If the government of Sudan is willing to accept the pressure of the international community to sign, and the parties are not ready to do so, then they have to bear the brunt" and face "political consequences" (Ibid.), which, while it does not necessarily suggest that Pronk is in favor of the genocidal retribution facing innocent Darfurians, does indicate his naïve self-deception that such "political consequences" will likely be paid in blood.
With Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick headed to Khartoum to lead a last-ditch effort to persuade the rebels to sign, the US is demonstrating that it is indeed investing some capital in achieving peace in Darfur. We can only hope that Zoellick will not adopt the condescending tactic of simply attempt to convince the SLM/A and JEM leaders to sign a document that grossly violates their interests and that his attempts to extract concessions from the GoS, namely in assuring disarmament of the Janjaweed, prove wholehearted and successful. This, however, will be difficult in the face of strong opposition to the proposal as it stands by both the JEM, whose delegate Ahmed Tugod, cautioned, "We are not going to accept this document for signature unless there are fundamental changes made to the document," and the SLM/A, who, while leaving open a slight possibility of signing, similarly stated that "[i]f the proposal does not include all our demands we will not sign" (see "Darfur peace talks extend deadline for two days," Sudan Tribune, 30 April 2006, at http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15380). Even more of an obstacle is likely Khartoum's unwillingness to move anywhere beyond its staked out position of false accomodation, evidenced by the gruff departure of Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha from Abuja.