Punishing the Good Guys?

At its meeting on Monday, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) once again extended the deadline for the two holdout rebel groups to accept the Darfur Peace Agreement laid out in Abuja and accepted by the dominant SLA factions' leader, Minni Arco Minnawi. This extension, however, is tempered by the PSC's warning of issuing sanctions on the two groups if they do not accept the agreement by the new date of May 31. This threat exhibits the growing exasperation of AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare in dealing with the rebels, whom he characterizes as very frustrating to work with, but it also attests to the AU's unfortunate tendency to allow itself to be manipulated by the Government of Sudan in Khartoum. The GoS has effectively stiffarmed the peace talks at Abuja; Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha, previously the main figurehead Khartoum was displaying to show its dedication to the talks, left Abuja long ago, and Government spokesman Amin Omar has highhandedly asserted that Khartoum "...will not open the negotiation again and there is no problem (in the peace agreement) which should be negotiated any more" (Xinhua, “Sudan refuses to reopen talks on Darfur peace deal,” 17 May 2006). This leaves me with the sinking feeling that, by portraying its threat of sanctions on groups that fail to sign the accord as enforcement of its ceasefire provisions, the AU is trying to cover Khartoum's tracks and cast a gloss of legitimacy over the Government's obstinacy. The Government's sharp line-drawing, refusing to consider any further concessions, also convinces me that it is not worried that the DPA as stands will prove a significant obstacle to achieving their genocidal aims of self-preservation.

I do not mean for my title to be deceptive. No one in Darfur can truly be considered a "good guy." The province is so rife in guns, abuses, and corruption that any attempt at a ceasefire or peace accord is by default a steep uphill battle. Furthermore, recent reports that the internecine squabbles between SLA factions have once again flared up in violence - violence that the Sudan Tribune describes as "gunmen on pick-up trucks and horseback...burning huts, killing, looting, and even raping women, in raids just as deadly as those of the Arab "Janjaweed" militia ("After peace, Darfur's rebels turn on each other," Sudan Tribune, 17 May 2006) - greatly decrease my dim hopes that the two groups can coalesce under the unified banner of protecting the people of Darfur. To engage in violence only gives the GoS legitimate bargaining capital; it is much easier to convince the AU of the desirability of sanctions on the rebels if they are indeed actively violating the ceasefire. The problem with threatening sanctions on the el-Nur faction of the SLA and Khalil Ibrahim's JEM is of course that it ignores the flagrant, and likely deadlier and more systematic, ceasefire violations simultaneously and wantonly carried out by Government-backed Janjaweed militias immediately after the DPA theoretically mandated their disarmament; for example, Janjaweed attacks in seven villages
around Kutum in the past week have killed 11 people, providing solid evidence that the piece of paper signed in Abuja has not translated into any meaningful relaxation of the genocidal status quo. The additions to the DPA that el-Nur is pushing for constitute entirely reasonable assurances for the safety and security of the people of Darfur to be upheld in a realistic and effective way. El-Nur demands include “adequate compensation for the individuals and families who have suffered losses during the conflict," a vital step in returning Darfurians to their livelihoods, as well as crucial specifications of what should be the fundamental motivating concern at Abuja: disarmament of the Janjaweed. El-Nur requests "full involvement of SLM/A in key aspects of security arrangements including ensuring the protection of civilians as they return to their original places and the mechanisms for monitoring the disarmament of the Janjaweed" (Sudan Tribune, "Rebel JEM mulls joining Darfur peace deal," 17 May 2006) he should not be censured for seeking to achieve what Abuja was indeed premised on achieving.

Even without accepting el-Nur's characterization of the SLA as "freedom fighters," he is correct in stating that "sanctions are for those who commit crimes" (The Daily Telegraph, "Darfur rebels reject sanctions threat," 17 May 2006). Surely there is no crime - especially not the refusal to sign an agreement that does not adequately provide for protection of the victims of the Darfur conflict - that should overshadow that of genocide. To threaten sanctions on rebel groups for not signing a "peace" agreement, while ignoring the persistent (and illegal) campaign of systematic violence wreaked by the Government and its proxies, is to make a mockery of the seriousness of the attempt at peace, as well as of the AU's status in general as a force whose mission should be to protect civilians.